Solana proposes retiring durable nonces after $270 million Drift hack
Solana developers have filed a proposal to remove the durable nonce feature exploited in the April Drift Protocol breach, while the platform also faces growing criticism of Pump.fun.
Key takeaways
- Solana’s SIMD-0723 proposal would retire durable nonces, forcing all transactions to use recent blockhashes.
- The change aims to prevent future attacks similar to the April 2026 $270 million Drift hack that leveraged offline‑signed durable nonces.
- Pump.fun is under intensified scrutiny for high fees, influencer‑driven promotions, and undisclosed wallet activity.
Solana’s core developers have submitted a protocol amendment, SIMD-0723, that would eliminate the durable nonce transaction mechanism after it was used to facilitate a $270 million theft of the Drift Protocol in April 2026. The proposal, filed on November 5, targets a feature that lets signed transactions remain valid indefinitely, a convenience for custodians that attackers turned into an exploit. At the same time, the Solana ecosystem is dealing with heightened criticism of the Pump.fun trading platform over fees, influencer promotions, and alleged hidden‑wallet trading.
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Update, Nov 11, 06:08 UTC: Unchained reports that the SIMD-0723 draft names Anza’s Programmatic Signer and Blueshift’s Vector as the two replacement programs and requires separate approvals from an Anza team member and Jump Crypto’s Firedancer team before merging. The proposal also notes that only the nonce‑initialization, advance and upgrade instructions will be disabled, leaving withdrawal and reassignment functions intact, and cites a 2022 incident that stalled mainnet for about 4.5 hours. According to Max Resnick’s data, nonce transactions comprised roughly 3.1 % of all transactions in one epoch but accounted for about 30 % of priority‑fee revenue, with 97.5 % of fee‑paying nonce accounts concentrated in 555 addresses.
Why durable nonces were removed
Durable nonces replace Solana’s standard 30‑second blockhash reference with a stored value, allowing a transaction to be signed offline and executed later. According to CryptoNews, the Drift attackers obtained administrative signatures through an air‑gapped signing process, then waited more than a week before broadcasting the transactions, seizing control of the protocol and draining at least $270 million. The exploit prompted Drift to attribute the attack to a North‑Korean linked group. SIMD-0723 would require all future transactions to include a recent blockhash, effectively disabling the indefinite‑validity window.
Impact on exchanges and custodians
The durable nonce feature was widely used by exchanges, institutional custodians and multisig organizations that need offline signing workflows longer than Solana’s typical transaction window. Removing it forces these participants to adopt alternative offline‑signing solutions or redesign their operational processes. Solana’s developers are reportedly exploring replacement programs that could preserve offline signing capabilities without the security risks associated with durable nonces, though the details remain under discussion.

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