Researchers have uncovered a coordinated campaign that injected malicious code into the website‑optimization platform Optimizely, affecting 178 high‑profile domains. The injection, dubbed “Optimjack” by security analyst Amirul Iman, was designed to replace legitimate cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker‑controlled ones and to harvest payment‑card information entered by visitors. According to Cointelegraph, the compromised sites included hardware‑wallet maker Ledger, trading platforms such as IG and Interactive Investor, and media outlets like the BBC, CNN and the BBC, exposing millions of daily users to the threat.

Update, Nov 17, 14:32 UTC: Protos reported that the campaign affected 186 high‑value websites, adding sites such as IKEA, Air France and GitLab to the list, and that researcher Scott Helme estimated up to 1.4 million devices may have been impacted. Helme also traced roughly $7,000 in crypto to the attackers but suggested only about $2,300 represented victims’ funds, according to Protos.

Update, Nov 17, 11:29 UTC: Report URI said the attacker’s wallets received about $7,150 in crypto before being emptied on November 17, and one Tron address used was linked to earlier campaigns. Optimizely confirmed it had patched a signup‑flow flaw, blocked the vulnerable path, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts, according to its statement. The malicious code was found in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely scripts examined, and by 21:52 UTC only a single infected snippet remained live, per the latest checks.

Update, Nov 17, 08:11 UTC: Report URI traced about $7,040 in cryptocurrency transferred to attacker‑controlled wallets, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, TRON and stablecoins, by November 16, according to CryptoNews. The campaign also deployed code linked to the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, targeting iPhone and iPad users, as noted by CoinCentral.

How the Attack Operated

The malicious payload was served through scripts hosted by Optimizely, a tool widely used for A/B testing and content delivery. When a visitor loaded a compromised page, the injected code could silently alter copied wallet addresses, directing funds to addresses controlled by the attackers. In parallel, the malware captured credit‑card details entered into form fields, a capability highlighted by cybersecurity firm StepSecurity. The attack vector leveraged the trust placed in third‑party optimization services, allowing the code to execute across a broad range of unrelated websites.